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Relatively absolute? The undermining of 
Article 3 ECHR in Ahmad v UK 
 





The recent decision of the Fourth Section of the ECtHR in Ahmad v UK 
dangerously undermines the well-established case-law of the Court on 
counter-terrorism and non-refoulement towards torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment. Although ostensibly rejecting the ‘relativist’ approach to 
Article 3 ECHR adopted by the House of Lords in Wellington, the Court appeared 
to accept that what is a breach of Article 3 in a domestic context may not be a 
breach in an extradition or expulsion context. This statement is difficult to 
reconcile with the jurisprudence constante of the Court in the last fifteen years. 
The Grand Chamber will hopefully reaffirm the view that Article 3 ECHR is an 
absolute right in all its applications, including non-refoulement, regardless of who 
the potential victim of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment is, what she may 
have done, or where the treatment at issue would occur. 
 
Accepted for publication in the Modern Law Review (2013) 
© Natasa Mavronicola, Francesco Messineo 







Only rarely do decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) elicit 
positive responses from the UK government and the UK media at the same time. A 
recent exception was the unanimous judgment of the Fourth Section of the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) in Babar Ahmad and others v UK, 
which found that there would be no breach of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) in extraditing a number of terrorist 
suspects to face trial and probably imprisonment in ‘super-maximum security’ 
detention facilities in the United States of America.
1
 The decision was hailed in 
some quarters as the first sign of the ECtHR finally showing a common sense 
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1 
Babar Ahmad and others v UK App Nos 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09, 
Judgment of 10 April 2012 (Ahmad hereinafter). 
approach to terrorism and human rights.
2
 In fact, certain aspects of the decision 
undermine the well-established jurisprudence of the Court on the relationship 
between counter-terrorism and the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment. Even if the judgment formally rejected the ‘relativist’ 
approach to Article 3 ECHR adopted by the House of Lords in Wellington v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,
3
 some concessions to the line of 
reasoning of the minority in the House of Lords imply a turn towards ‘relativism’ 
in the threshold of inhuman or degrading treatment in a non-refoulement context. In 
this article, we argue that this is a most unfortunate departure from the 
jurisprudence constante of the Court in the last fifteen years.
4
 The Grand Chamber 
will hopefully once again reaffirm, as it has recently done in Saadi, that Article 3 
ECHR is an absolute right in all its applications, including non-refoulement, 
regardless of who the potential victim of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
is, what she may have done, or where the treatment at issue would occur.
5
 
The six applicants in Ahmad – Babar Ahmad, Haroon Rashid Aswat, Syed 
Tahla Ahsan, Mustafa Kamal Mustafa (Abu Hamza), Adel Abdul Bary and Khaled 
Al-Fawwaz – were all the subject of extradition requests made by the United States 
to the United Kingdom. Their indictments ranged from an Internet-based 
conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a foreign 
country (Babar Ahmad, Syed Tahla Ahsan) to over 269 counts of murder (Khaled 
Al-Fawwaz). The applicants claimed that, if extradited to the USA, they would face 
treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.  
Article 3 ECHR prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.
6
 The provision has been consistently construed as encompassing a 
prohibition of refoulement (any form of rejection at the frontier, deportation, 
expulsion or extradition) towards territories where there is a real risk that a 
prohibited treatment will occur.
7
 The applicants’ claim was based primarily on the 
realistic prospect of being imprisoned in a ‘super-max’ security prison, ADX 
                                                          
2
 The UK Home Secretary ‘welcomed’ the decision: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-
centre/news/Abu-Hamza [last accessed 24 July 2012]. See also ‘Abu Hamza extradition ruling 
praised by David Cameron’, The Guardian, 10 April 2012, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/apr/10/abu-hamza-extradition-praised-david-cameron [last 
accessed 24 July 2012]; J. Rozenberg, ‘European court makes the right call on Abu Hamza’, The 
Guardian, 10 April 2012, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/apr/10/european-court-
abu-hamza-strasbourg [last accessed 24 July 2012]; ‘Leading article: A ruling that confounds 
Strasbourg's critics’, The Independent, 10 April 2012, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-a-ruling-that-confounds-
strasbourgs-critics-7631193.html [last accessed 24 July 2012]; T. Whitehead and M. Beckford, 
‘Landmark victory to send Hamza and terror suspects to US’, The Daily Telegraph, 10 April 2012, 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9195959/Landmark-victory-to-
send-Hamza-and-terror-suspects-to-US.html [last accessed 24 July 2012]. 
3
 R (Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 72. 
4
 At least since Chahal v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413. 
5
 See Saadi v Italy (2009) 49 EHRR 30. See n 82 below. 
6 ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. 
7
 See Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439; this was confirmed in in more than 45 ECtHR judgments 
since then. A list of judgments until August 2008 may be found in K. Wouters, International Legal 
Standards for the Protection from Refoulement (Antwerp; Oxford; Portland: Intersentia, 2009), 189; 
see generally N. Mole and C. Meredith, Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2010). 
Florence in Colorado.
8
  In the applicants’ view, conditions of detention there, 
which were likely to be exacerbated through the application of ‘special 
administrative measures’, would breach Article 3 inter alia because of the 
prolonged periods of solitary confinement.
9
 They also argued that, if convicted, 
they would probably face mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without any 
possibility of parole or other very long sentences. They submitted that this could 
also amount to a breach of Article 3, because the sentences would be de facto 
irreducible or grossly disproportionate.
10
 
The first complaint, regarding conditions of detention, was held inadmissible 
in relation to the fourth applicant, Abu Hamza, because the Court upheld its 
previous finding that, given his severe health condition, there was ‘no real risk of 
his spending anything more than a short period of time at ADX Florence’.11 The 
second applicant, Haroon Rashid Aswat, also posed a special case according to the 
Court because of his health conditions, and his complaint was adjourned.
12
 As to 
the other applicants, the Court found, first, that the conditions of detention at ADX 
Florence, despite their ‘highly restrictive’ nature, would not be in breach of Article 
3 ECHR.
13
 Second, the prospective long periods of imprisonment did not render 
the extradition incompatible with Article 3. In the Court’s view, a mandatory life 
sentence without possibility of parole would not be ‘per se incompatible with the 
Convention’, but simply ‘more likely to be grossly disproportionate’ and thus 
incompatible with Article 3 ECHR.
14
 The applicants were unable to show, at this 
point in time, that their sentences would be grossly disproportionate to the offences 
they were accused of and so could not prove a real risk of breach of Article 3.
15
 
The judgment raises many interesting questions, only some of which will be 
addressed here. We do not assess the accuracy of the Court’s finding that 
conditions of detention at ADX Florence do not constitute inhuman or degrading 
treatment;
16
 nor do we discuss whether the Court was correct in finding that life 
imprisonment without parole can, in certain circumstances, be considered 
compatible with Article 3.
17
 Our analysis will focus on the more general remarks of 
the Court as to the non-refoulement obligations under Article 3 of the 
                                                          
8
 The United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum Facility (ADX) is a male federal high 
security prison in Florence, Fremont County, Colorado. For media commentary on this type of 
prison, see E. Pilkington, ‘ADX Florence super-max prison: the Alcatraz of the Rockies’, The 
Guardian, 10 April 2012, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/10/abu-hamza-
isolation-supermax-prison [last accessed 24 July 2012]; S. Shane, ‘Beyond Guantánamo, a Web of 
Prisons for Terrorism Inmates’, The New York Times, 10 December 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/us/beyond-guantanamo-bay-a-web-of-federal-prisons.html 
[last accessed 24 July 2012]. 
9
 Ahmad, [186]-[196]. 
10
 ibid, [231]-[234]. 
11
 ibid, [5] and [217]. See also the admissibility decision: Babar Ahmad and others v UK 
Application Nos 24027/07, 11949/08 and 36742/08, Admissibility Decision of 6 July 2010. 
12 
Those complaints will now be considered under a new application number: 17299/12. 
13
 Ahmad, [218]-[224]. 
14
 ibid, [242]. 
15
 ibid, [235]-[244]. 
16 
For a critical consideration of the conditions in such prisons, see C. Dayan, The Law Is a White 
Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) 
17 For a brief analysis of recent ECtHR judgments on this topic, see ‘Life imprisonment: extradition 
- United States - Harkins v United Kingdom (9146/07)’ (2012) 3 EHRLR 332 and ‘Life 
imprisonment: criminal law - sentencing - whole life tariff - Vinter v United Kingdom (66069/09; 
130/10; 3896/10)’ (2012) 3 EHRLR 336. 
Convention.
18
 In order to do so, we will first briefly recall the established 
jurisprudence on the absolute nature of Article 3 ECHR and the scope and content 
of non-refoulement obligations under the ECHR; second, we will address the 
‘relativist’ approach to these obligations adopted by the House of Lords in 
Wellington; third, we will scrutinise the incomplete rejection of such a ‘relativist’ 
approach by the ECtHR in Ahmad. 
 
ARTICLE 3, RELATIVISM AND ABSOLUTISM 
 
The absolute nature of Article 3 ECHR  
It is generally accepted that Article 3 enshrines an absolute right.
19
 The absolute 
nature of Article 3 ECHR lies in three key elements: it admits of no qualifications 
or exceptions; it cannot be subject to derogation under Article 15 ECHR; and it 
applies to everyone no matter what.
20
 The consistently reiterated approach of the 
Court is that: 
The Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's 
conduct. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the 
Convention … Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and, 
under Article 15 (2), there can be no derogation therefrom even in 
the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.
21
 
This reflects the idea, put forward by theorists such as Gewirth, that an absolute 
right is one that can never be justifiably infringed and must be fulfilled without 
exception.
22
 At a time when global discourse on the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario 
abounds,
23
 the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber has recently addressed the threat of torture 
of a kidnapper with a view to discovering the whereabouts and potentially saving the 
life of a kidnapped child:  
The Court has confirmed that even in the most difficult 
circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised 
crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the 
conduct of the person concerned. The nature of the offence allegedly 




                                                          
18
 ibid, [162]-[179]. 
19
 See eg D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: 
Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 1995), 69. Jacobs, 
White and Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights, R. C. A. White and C. Ovey eds, 5th 
edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch 9; S. Foster, Human Rights & Civil Liberties, 2nd 
edn (Essex: Pearson Education, 2008), 27; D. Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in 
England and Wales, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 242. 
20
 See Ireland v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, [163]. For further analysis on the concept of an absolute 
right, see N. Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”? Deciphering absoluteness in the context of 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 12 HRLR (forthcoming). 
21
 Ireland v UK, n 20 above, [163].  . 
22 A. Gewirth, ‘Are There Any Absolute Rights?’ (1981) 31 (122) The Philosophical Quarterly 1. 
23
 The literature on the topic is vast. Compare eg A.M. Dershowitz, ‘The Torture Warrant: A 
Response to Professor Strauss’ (2003) 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 275 with H. Shue, ‘Torture in 
Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb’ (2006) 37 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 231. From a political 
perspective, see R. Blakeley, ‘Why Torture?’ (2007) 33 Review of International Studies 373. 
24
 Gäfgen v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 1, [87]. 
These statements confirm that the right enshrined in Article 3 cannot be balanced 




 Some scepticism, however, arises in relation to the interpretation and 
application of this absolute right. The terms ‘torture’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ 
are contestable and difficult to define, yet it is the Court’s task to interpret and 
apply them.
26
 The Court’s approach is fact-sensitive, especially when it comes to 
establishing the minimum threshold. In the words of the Court, ‘[t]he assessment of 
this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or 
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, 
etc’.27 Reference is also made to the ‘nature and context of the treatment’ as the 
‘circumstances of the case’.28 This context-specific approach has led some 
commentators to cast the absolute nature of Article 3 as ‘relative’. For instance, 
although Feldman states that obligations under Article 3 are ‘absolute, 
non-derogable and unqualified’,29 he remarks that ‘a degree of relativism cannot, in 
practice, be entirely excluded from the application of the notions of inhuman or 
degrading treatment’.30 Fenwick asserts that ‘…[the standard of treatment that 
qualifies as Article 3 ill-treatment] does not connote an absolute standard and, in its 
application, it allows for a measure of discretion’.31  
 In practice, the assessment of the Court is indeed context-specific and, in 
that sense, relative. The crucial question, however, is which are the legitimate 
factors and circumstances to be taken into account in the interpretation and 
application of Article 3. This problem cannot be fully analysed here, but three brief 
examples may help to illustrate the significance of this question. The 
imprisonment, for lawful reasons, in a regular police cell of a healthy adult person 
will not be considered inhuman or degrading. The imprisonment in such a cell of a 
severely disabled Thalidomide victim will.
32
 Similarly, in determining whether a 
punishment is inhuman or degrading, the proportionality of the punishment to the 
conduct of the person in question is a legitimate factor to consider.
33
 Thus, a term 
                                                          
25
 On the notion of a hierarchy of human rights within the ECHR, see A. Ashworth, ‘Security, 
Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights’ in Benjamin J Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security 
and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 212. Beyond ECHR discourse, see T. Koji 
‘Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the Perspective of Non-
derogable Rights’, (2001) 12 (5) EJIL 917; D. Shelton, ‘Hierarchy of Norms and Human Rights: Of 
Trumps and Winners’, (2002) 65 Saskatchewan Law Review 332. 
26
 See J. Waldron, Torture, Terror and Trade-offs: Philosophy for the White House (Oxford: OUP 
2012), ch 9; see also M. K. Addo and N. Grief, ‘Does Article 3 Enshrine Absolute Rights?’ (1998) 9 
EJIL 510. 
27
 Ireland v UK, n 20 above, [162] (emphasis added). 
28 
A v UK (1999) 27 EHRR 611, [20]. 
29
 Feldman, n 19 above, 242. 
30
 ibid.  
31
 H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 3rd edn (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2004), 
44-45. 
32
 See Price v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 53. 
33
 For an overview of the use of proportionality in a penal context, see A. Ristroph, ‘Proportionality 
as a Principle of Limited Government’ (2005) 55 Duke Law Journal 263. This test must be 
distinguished from the proportionality test in wider human rights discourse. Regarding the potential 
detrimental implications of proportionality discourse under Article 3, see S. Palmer, ‘A Wrong 
Turning: Article 3 ECHR and Proportionality’, (2006) 65(2) Cambridge Law Journal 438. On 
proportionality more generally, see (a minimal selection out of a rich discourse): B. Goold, L. 
of 10 years’ imprisonment in a standard adult prison meted out to a 30-year-old 
man convicted of armed robbery can be legitimately distinguished from the same 
term inflicted on a 70-year-old man convicted of tax evasion. As a third example, 
consider the shooting of someone in the leg. It certainly causes a great deal of 
physical and probably mental suffering. Shooting someone in the leg when he is in 
custody, for the purpose of obtaining some information from him would probably 
be considered by the Court to fall within the definition of torture.
34
 The shooting of 
a protester in the leg by a police officer on duty for no particular reason will, at the 
least, be seen to amount to inhuman treatment.
35
 Yet if a police officer took the 
shot as the minimum measure necessary to incapacitate a person who is in the 
process of attacking the police officer or a nearby third party with a knife, such 
shooting would not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment.
36
 Similarly, high 
security conditions stemming from and directed exclusively at averting a danger 
posed by an individual to the physical integrity of others may, if they sufficiently 
respect the dignity of that individual, be compatible with Article 3. 
This ‘relativism’ in the application of Article 3 does not undermine its 
absolute nature but lies within the legitimate interpretation and application of its 
terms. This suggests that the key underlying legitimate concerns which come into 
play are the agency and dignity of individuals.
37
 Although the Court takes into 
account many factors, some circumstances must be seen as irrelevant and/or 
illegitimate in the identification of treatment as inhuman, degrading or torturous. 
Treatment is no more or less in breach of the ECHR depending on the colour of the 
individual’s hair, what the perpetrators had for breakfast, or, more importantly 
here, the geographical location where treatment takes place.
38
 The irrelevance of 
the geographical location is enshrined in the non-refoulement obligation, to which 




Non-refoulement obligations under the ECHR 
The construction of Article 3 ECHR as implying non-refoulement obligations dates 
back to the 1970s,
40
 but came to fruition only in 1989 with the Soering case.
41
 The 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Lazarus and G. Swiney, Public Protection, Proportionality and the Search for Balance (Ministry of 
Justice Research Series, 10/07, September 2007); M. Cohen-Eliya and I. Porat, ‘American balancing 
and German proportionality: the historical origins’ (2010) 8(2) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 263.  
34
 For a critical analysis on the component elements of torture under the ECHR, see C. McGlynn, 
‘Rape, torture and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2009) 58(3) ICLQ 565-595. 
35
 See, eg, Güler and Öngel v Turkey App Nos 29612/05 and 30668/05, Judgment of 4 October 
2011. 
36 
For the approach of the ECtHR to the use of force in such contexts, see: Güler and Öngel (ibid); 
Muradova v Azerbaijan (2011) 52 EHRR 41; Rehbock v Slovenia (1998) 26 EHRR CD120. The 
third example is adapted from N. Mavronicola, ‘Güler and Öngel v Turkey: Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Strasbourg’s discourse on the justified use of force’ 
(2013) MLR (forthcoming). 
37 
For a critical assessment of dignity’s many faces, see C. McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial 
interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19 EJIL 655. 
38 
See Saadi, n 5 above, [138] and the discussion below.  
39 
The identification of treatment as inhuman or degrading or as amounting to torture is a distinct 
question from the issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR, which we are not 
addressing here. 
40
 See e.g. X v Federal Republic of Germany (1974) 1 DR 73. See A. Cassese, ‘Prohibition of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment  or Punishment’, in R.S.J. MacDonald (ed), The 
ECtHR has reaffirmed and expanded upon this construction in many cases since.
42
 
The basis for this development was simple: Article 3 protects individuals who are 
within a Contracting State’s jurisdiction from proscribed treatment. As such, this 
protection applies regardless of whether the treatment is inflicted directly in the 
Contracting State or will be inflicted somewhere else at a later date.
43
 In the latter 
case, a Contracting State’s responsibility under Article 3 is engaged when 
‘substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if 
deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 
3 in the receiving country’.44 According to the Court, this ‘liability [is] incurred … 
by reason of … having taken action which has as a direct consequence the 
exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment’.45 The expulsion of a person 
by a Contracting State to another State where they face a real risk of proscribed 
treatment is thus a breach of Article 3.  
While international refugee lawyers have been quick to recognise that this 
construction of Article 3 provided a complementary form of international 
protection in Europe in addition to the 1951 Convention on the Status of 
Refugees,
46
 Article 3 ECHR was by no means limited to those seeking asylum 
from persecution.
47
 The resulting obligation not to deport, expel, extradite, reject at 
the frontier or otherwise ‘refoule’ someone at risk admits no limitation or 
exception. Anyone, including ‘a suspected terrorist’, has a right not to be sent to a 
territory where they face a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. In Saadi v Italy, the UK as an intervening party had tried to argue that 
a distinction ought to be made between treatment inflicted at home and treatment 
inflicted by the authorities of another (non-Contracting) State, which ‘should be 
weighed against the interests of the community as a whole’, for example in cases 
involving suspected terrorists. This was one of the many attempts on the part of the 
UK at altering the Court’s jurisprudence on the relationship between terrorism and 
non-refoulement.
48
 The Grand Chamber strongly rejected the UK government’s 
arguments, reaffirming that the protection granted by Article 3 ECHR was 
absolute:  
                                                                                                                                                                 
European system for the protection of human rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 225-261, 
248-249. 
41
 n 7 above. This section is partly adapted from F. Messineo, ‘Non-refoulement Obligations in 
Public International Law: Towards a New Protection Status?’, in S. Juss (ed.), Research Companion 
to Migration Theory and Policy (Ashgate, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1802800 [last accessed 24 July 2012], 12-15. 
42 n 7 above. 
43
 As to the relevance of prohibited treatment carried out by non-state actors, see eg HLR v France 
(1998) 26 EHRR 29, [40].  
44
 HLR v France, n 43 above, para 34; Chahal v UK, n 4 above, [74]. 
45
 Soering, n 7 above, [91]. 
46
 See eg H. Lambert, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees: 
Limits and Opportunities’, 24 Refugee Surv. Q. (2005) 39-55. See also Article 2(e) and Article 
15(b), EU Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, Official Journal L 
304, 30/09/2004 p. 12. 
47
 See V. Chetail, ‘Le droit des réfugiées à l’épreuve des droits de l’homme: bilan de la 
jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur l’interdiction du renvoi des 
étrangers menacés de torture et de traitements inhumains ou dégradants’, 37 Revue belge de droit 
int. (2004) 156, at 194-195. 
48
 See Chahal, n 4 above, [79]-[80]. 
the Court cannot accept the argument of the UK Government, 
supported by the respondent Government, that a distinction must be 
drawn under art.3 between treatment inflicted directly by a 
signatory state and treatment that might be inflicted by the 
authorities of another state, and that protection against this latter 
form of ill-treatment should be weighed against the interests of the 
community as a whole. [citation omitted] Since protection against 
the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision 
imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in 
the receiving country, would run the real risk of being subjected to 
such treatment. As the Court has repeatedly held, there can be no 
derogation from that rule.
49
 
In sum, under the established case law of the ECtHR as reaffirmed by the Grand 
Chamber three years before Ahmad, Article 3 ECHR encompassed an absolute 
prohibition of refoulement of those facing a real risk of any form of Article 3-
proscribed ill-treatment. The fact that the prohibited treatment would occur 
somewhere else and that the person was accused of certain crimes rather than 
others were not legitimate circumstances to take into account when assessing the 
risk of ill-treatment. 
 
The House of Lords in Wellington  
Having failed to prompt a change to the Strasbourg Court’s approach, the UK 
government persisted in its advocacy of more ‘relativist’ interpretations of Article 3 
before its own domestic courts. It eventually succeeded in persuading the majority 
of the House of Lords in Wellington to adopt a more restrictive reading of the 
provision. According to Lord Hoffmann, Baroness Hale and Lord Carswell, it was 
possible to draw a distinction between extradition cases and other non-refoulement 
cases, because the interests of justice should be taken into account in the context of 
extradition.
50
 Relying on the ambiguity of the Soering case in that regard,
51
 Lord 
Hoffmann put it in the following terms: 
[The ECtHR’s language in Soering] make[s] it clear that in cases of 
extradition, article 3 does not apply as if the extraditing state were 
simply responsible for any punishment likely to be inflicted in the 
receiving state. It applies only in a modified form which takes into 
account the desirability of arrangements for extradition.
52
 
According to Lord Hoffmann, while there was no question that a risk of torture 
implied an absolute prohibition, the situation as to inhuman and degrading 
                                                          
49
 Saadi, n 5 above, [138]. A different approach was notoriously adopted by the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3, [78]. 
50
 Wellington, n 3 above, [22]-[24], [36], [48], [51]-[58]. 
51
 Soering, n 7 above, [89]: ‘[I]nherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual's fundamental rights. As movement about the world becomes easier and 
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treatment was ‘more complicated’53 because the assessment of what constitutes 
inhuman or degrading treatment must be made by reference to the context, 
including the fact that the person might otherwise escape justice. This implied a 
distinction between what would breach Article 3 in the domestic context, and what 
would breach Article 3 in an extradition context:  
[T]he desirability of extradition is a factor to be taken into account 
in deciding whether the punishment likely to be imposed in the 
receiving state attains the “minimum level of severity” which 
would make it inhuman and degrading. Punishment which counts 
as inhuman and degrading in the domestic context will not 




Lord Brown and Lord Scott disagreed. As Lord Scott put it, the majority’s 
reasoning implied a ‘relativist’ approach to Article 3: 
It is accepted that the absolute nature of the article 3 bar on torture 
would bar extradition to a country where the extradited person 
would face torture and that that which would constitute torture for 
article 3 purposes in Europe would constitute torture for those 
purposes everywhere. But it is suggested that treatment or 
punishment that might for article 3 purposes be inhuman or 
degrading in Europe would not necessarily need to be so 
categorised if it were treatment or punishment likely to be faced in 
the requesting country by a person faced with extradition to that 
country for crimes committed there. But, if that is so, how can it be 
said that article 3 rights not to be subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment are absolute rights?
55
 
This, Lord Scott considered, was incompatible with the absolute nature of Article 3 
ECHR: ‘[T]he standard of treatment or punishment apt to attract the adjectives 
“inhuman or degrading” for article 3 purposes ought to be a constant. I do not see 
how otherwise the article 3 prohibition regarding such treatment or punishment can 
be regarded as an absolute one’.56 In Lord Brown’s view, both Chahal and Saadi 




The ECtHR rejected Wellington but then adopted its own ‘relativism’ 
The Wellington case was discussed at length by the Fourth Section of the ECtHR in 
Ahmad. Before assessing the merits of the applicants’ claim, the ECtHR sought to 
address the underlying question of how the Soering jurisprudence on 
non-refoulement must be applied in extradition cases. The majority of the House of 
Lords in Wellington considered that there was a tension between Soering and 
Chahal,
58
 a matter which called for clarification. The ECtHR identified three key 
distinctions drawn by the majority of the House of Lords in Wellington in relation 
to the interpretation and application of Article 3 ECHR:  
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a) a distinction ‘between extradition cases and other cases of removal from the 
territory of a Contracting State’;59  
b) a distinction ‘between torture and other forms of ill-treatment proscribed by 
Article 3’ (that is, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment);60  
c) a distinction ‘between the assessment of the minimum level of severity required 
in the domestic context and the same assessment in the extra-territorial context’.61 
The Court gave short shrift to the first two distinctions. It made clear that ‘the 
question whether there is a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in another 
State cannot depend on the legal basis for removal to that State’.62 This was tied to 
the Court’s unequivocal position in Chahal that the basis for seeking the 
extradition of an individual, notably their commission of criminal offences, cannot 
be a ‘balancing point’ requiring a higher level of risk of Article 3 treatment to bar 
expulsion.
63
 This was a clear rejection of the problematic ‘balancing’ discourse in 
Wellington.  
Second, the Court acknowledged that it had ‘always distinguished between 
torture on the one hand and inhuman or degrading punishment on the other’.64 
However, it added that this distinction was almost impossible to draw in a 
speculative manner through a prospective assessment. For this reason, the Court 
had always refrained from determining whether the ill-treatment faced on 
expulsion should be characterised as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.
65
 The Court clarified that whether the risked treatment would be 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the effect of a real risk of 
such treatment in the receiving State was the same: expulsion would amount to a 
violation of Article 3 ECHR and therefore constitute a breach of the Convention. 
Things became much more complex as the Court addressed the third 
distinction. The Court appeared initially to take a strong stance, rejecting the idea 
that the assessment of the ‘minimum level of severity’ test could vary between 
domestic and extra-territorial contexts. It addressed head-on the Soering 
‘balancing’ dicta,66 which, despite having been overcome by Chahal,67 was a 
cornerstone of the UK strategy to temper the absolute prohibition on refoulement 
and as such was relied upon by the majority in Wellington:  
The Court recalls its statement in Chahal … that it was not to be 
inferred from paragraph 89 of Soering that there was any room for 
balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons for expulsion 
in determining whether a State’s responsibility under Article 3 was 
engaged. It also recalls that this statement was reaffirmed in Saadi 
v. Italy, … where the Court rejected the argument advanced by the 
United Kingdom Government that the risk of ill-treatment if a 
person is returned should be balanced against the danger he or she 
posed. In Saadi the Court also found that the concepts of risk and 
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dangerousness did not lend themselves to a balancing test because 
they were “notions that [could] only be assessed independently of 
each other” (ibid. § 139). The Court finds that the same approach 
must be taken to the assessment of whether the minimum level of 
severity has been met for the purposes of Article 3: this too can 




This was meant to reinforce the point that in assessing the risk of prohibited 
treatment in the receiving country, the Court was prevented from taking into 
account the ‘demands of the general interest of the community’69 or the need for 
suspected offenders to be brought to justice.
70
 The Court confirmed that Soering 
was, to this extent, no longer good law: 
[I]n the twenty-two years since the Soering judgment, in an Article 3 
case the Court has never undertaken an examination of the 
proportionality of a proposed extradition or other form of removal 
from a Contracting State. To this extent, the Court must be taken to 
have departed from the approach contemplated by paragraphs 89 and 
110 of the Soering judgment.
71
 
The conclusion thus appeared largely straightforward. The Chahal ruling, as 
reaffirmed in Saadi, must be considered to apply equally to all persons under the 
jurisdiction of a Contracting State and without distinction between the proscribed 
forms of ill-treatment.
72
 So far, so good. Yet, immediately after reaching this 
conclusion and apparently setting aside the ‘relativist’ approach of the majority of 
the House of Lords, the Court’s line of argument unravelled without any apparent 
reason. 
Up to paragraph 176, Ahmad could be read as a robust defence of the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence on non-refoulement against recent misconceptions. 
Immediately afterwards, however, the Court inexplicably set out to undo much of 
its defence in a paragraph worth quoting in full: 
1.  However, in reaching this conclusion, the Court would underline 
that it agrees with Lord Brown’s observation in Wellington that the 
absolute nature of Article 3 does not mean that any form of ill-
treatment will act as a bar to removal from a Contracting State. As 
Lord Brown observed, this Court has repeatedly stated that the 
Convention does not purport to be a means of requiring the 
Contracting States to impose Convention standards on other States 
[citation omitted]. This being so, treatment which might violate 
Article 3 because of an act or omission of a Contracting State might 
not attain the minimum level of severity which is required for there 
to be a violation of Article 3 in an expulsion or extradition case. For 
example, a Contracting State’s negligence in providing appropriate 
medical care within its jurisdiction has, on occasion, led the Court to 
                                                          
68
 Ahmad, [172]. 
69
 Soering, n 7 above, [89]. 
70
 ibid, [89] and [110]. 
71
 Ahmad, [173]. 
72
 Ahmad, [176]. As to the question of being ‘within the jurisdiction’ of a Contracting State, see 
Hirsi Jamaa and others  v Italy App No 27765/09, Judgment of 23 February 2012; Al Saadoon and 
Mufdhi v UK (2010) 51 EHRR 9; Al-Skeini and others v UK (2011) 53 EHRR 18. 
find a violation of Article 3 but such violations have not been so 
readily established in the extra-territorial context [citation omitted].
73
 
The statement emphasised above constitutes a curious new development in 
Article 3 case law, which had made its first appearance in another judgment of the 
Fourth Section of the Court, Harkins and Edwards v UK.
74
 It suggests that Article 3 
means something else – something less, in fact! – when the context is one of 
expulsion to a non-ECHR State, whether by extradition or otherwise.  
The underlying reason for this pronouncement is unclear – it may be that the 
Court was concerned with clarifying the minimum threshold of application of 
Article 3. The Court outlined the factors that had so far been relevant in engaging 
Article 3, including duration, intention to humiliate or debase and ‘a degree of 
distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering 
inherent in detention’.75 These factors, the Court added, depended closely on the 
facts and ‘so will not be readily established prospectively in an extradition or 
expulsion context’.76 The Court then concluded by stating, in a factual manner but 
with clear normative overtones, that ‘it has been very cautious in finding that 
removal from the territory of a Contracting State would be contrary to Article 3 of 
the Convention’ and that, ‘save for cases involving the death penalty, it has even 
more rarely found that there would be a violation of Article 3 if an applicant were to 
be removed to a State which had a long history of respect of democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law’,77 referring evidently to the USA.78 Indeed, it did not 
make such finding in this case. In a dubious twist of cultural relativism, the Court 
appeared to state without qualms that treatment amounting to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment in an ECHR State may not be contrary to 
Article 3, that is, not amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 




A DANGEROUS METHOD 
 
If the Court really wished to address concerns created by its own sometimes 
ambiguous construction of the minimum threshold of Article 3 ECHR,
80
 it chose 
the wrong method to do so. There are three reasons in particular why paragraph 177 
of Ahmad is highly problematic. First, as a matter of logic, the construction adopted 
is at odds with the absolute nature of Article 3 because it asserts that the Article 
might mean something in Europe and something else in Colorado. As outlined 
above, the absolute nature of Article 3 ECHR lies in three key elements: it admits of 
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no qualifications or exceptions; it cannot be subject to derogation under Article 15 
ECHR; and it applies to everyone no matter what.
81
 In an expulsion context, the 
Grand Chamber has affirmed that ‘[s]ince protection against the treatment 
prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision imposes an obligation not to 
extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving country, would run the real risk 
of being subjected to such treatment. As the Court has repeatedly held, there can be 
no derogation from that rule.’82 Yet what is the Court doing by placing certain acts 
or omissions of the State within the protection of Article 3 in a domestic context but 
outside it in an expulsion context if not engaging in an internal – and insidious – 
displacement of this absolute protection and creating acceptable ‘derogations’? 
Second, the statement undermines the universality of the prohibition of torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, which goes well beyond the 
confines of the European Convention on Human Rights and also binds the US 
government.
83
 The Court appears to suggest that it has rarely found and, by 
implication, would only rarely find a real risk of violation of Article 3 if an 
applicant were to be removed to ‘a State which had a long history of respect of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law’.84 Aside from its indefensible cultural 
implications, the statement that caution should be exercised when ‘good’ countries 
are concerned, compared to ‘bad’ countries, is all the more problematic given the 
last decade of human rights policies of the US government on counter-terrorism 
(Guantánamo and extra-ordinary renditions being two points of reference).
85
 Instead 
of performing its admittedly difficult task of interpreting and applying the terms 
contained in Article 3 ECHR, the Court suggested that the threshold can depend on 
the cultural and political affinity of the receiving country with ‘European’ values of 
‘democracy, human rights and the rule of law’. These are very unfortunate words. 
As the annual reports of Amnesty International and other NGOs show, no 
government anywhere in the world can claim to be a paragon of virtue as regards 
human rights, and it is certainly inappropriate for a Section of the Strasbourg Court 
to resume the untenable distinction between what appears to be the equivalent of 
‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ countries.86 In fact, Article 3 of the Convention Against 
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vestiges of such a distinction. 
Torture specifically invites authorities (and Courts) to ‘take into account all relevant 
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the [receiving] State … 
of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights’ when 
assessing cases of non-refoulement. Such an assessment must be based on the 
human rights record of the country in question, not on its cultural and political 
affinity with the sending country. 
Lastly, it is true that deciding whether a particular treatment or punishment 
triggers the Article 3 threshold is necessarily a question of fact to be evaluated in its 
context.
87
 Yet the ease with which the Court accepts certain implications of this 
fact-sensitive approach in a refoulement context is disturbing. Effectively, the Court 
posits that the protection in Article 3 may be absolute, but the assessment of 
whether it has been breached must predominantly be ex post facto, that is, after an 
individual actually does suffer what he or she is absolutely entitled not to suffer. 
According to the Court in Ahmad, the risk of proscribed treatment will not be easily 
established ex ante in an expulsion context. Based on this, it opted to err on the side 
of expulsion. The preventive function of human rights, notably of absolute rights, 
and the underlying basis of the preventive scope of non-refoulement are bypassed. 
Non-refoulement obligations exist to avert the suffering of irreparable harm
88
 and to 
render the guarantee in Article 3 ‘practical and effective and not theoretical and 
illusory’.89 All these fundamental considerations were lost in a few unfortunate 
lines in Ahmad. The Grand Chamber will hopefully set the record straight.
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